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Separation of powers is one of the fundamental
principles underlying all governments within the
United States. This concept is embedded in the struc-
ture of the United States Constitution (U.S.
Constitution) and plays a critical role in almost every
element of governmental action. Under the U.S.
Constitution. the legislative body is not, and should
not be, empowered to rule on whether its own action
constitutes a compensable taking, However, with
regard to environmental harm that may constitute a
taking in California, the California Supreme Court has
adopted a different position, In San Diego Gas & Electric
v. Superior Court (Covalt)' the California Supreme Court
vested the California Public Utilities Commission with
the authority to decide whether an intrusion is harm-
ful, thereby ruling on whether its own actions imple-
menting the intrusion result in a compensable taking.
This Comment deals with the role of separation of
powers as it applies to government action under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, The Fifth
Amendment provides that. "lnlo person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation "2 In a typical
application of this amendment, a legislative or execu-
tive action results in an intrusion on some individual's
property, and the court reviews the action to determine
whether that action resulted in a compensable taking.
The U.S. Constitution and its concept of separation of
powers, along with the Fifth Amendment, require that
this process take place in order to protect the proper-
ty owner's rights. in Covalt, the California Supreme
Court improperly left the entire decision to the
California Public Utilities Commission, eliminating the
protections afforded by the US. Constitution. and con-
tradicting both California and Federal law.
II. Background
During 1988 and 1989, the California Public
Utilities Commission (Commission) studied the health
effects of Electromagnetic Fields (EMFs) 3 After study-
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ing much of the scientific data available, the
Commission decided that there was not
enough information to determine whether
EMFs were in fact harmful.4 Based on this find-
ing, the Commission placed no absolute
restrictions on the levels of EMFs to which the
public, in particular property owners along
transmission right-of-ways, could be exposed.5
At about the time of this decision, San Diego
Gas & Electric ("SDG&E") upgraded some of its
transmission facilities, increasing the EMF
exposure levels along those transmission right-
of-ways. 6 The adjacent property owners brought
suit against SDG&E, claiming that increased
levels of EMFs constituted compensable harm
under Article I, Section 19 of the California
Constitution.
7
Reviewing the case, the California Supreme
Court ruled that the Commission has the exclu-
sive jurisdiction to determine whether EMFs
constitute a public health risk. Relying on the
Commission's decision to not require utilities
to mitigate EMF exposure-but not being able
to identify any explicit statement by the
Commission that EMFs are not harmful-the
court held that the Commission had deter-
mined that EMFs did not pose any public
health risk.8 Since the Commission had previ-
ously found EMFs to be harmless, there could
be no allegations of harm to the property.9
Since there was no harm, the Commission's
decision to permit SDG&E to increase the lev-
els of EMFs did not, and could not, result in
compensable harm to the property.1°
In this case, the Commission permitted an
action to occur,II and the action had an impact
on private property.' 2 The property owners
claimed the impact amounted to compensable
harm to their property.'3 The court ruled that
there can be no compensable harm to the prop-
4. See id. at 927-28.
5. See id. at 931..
6. See id. at 91i.
7 See id. at 939.
8. See id. at 939.
9. See id. at 950.
10. See id. at 940.
i1. SDG&E was permitted to increase EMF levels
erty because a trial court's finding that this type
of impact is harmful would conflict with the
Commission's policy on EMFs. 14 The policy is
that EMFs have not been found to pose a sig-
nificant public health risk. 5 In this situation,
the same government body that has permitted
the impact to occur, has been given the power
to decide whether that impact constitutes
harm.
In light of this decision, Part IlI of this Note
will explore a brief history of California takings
law and the conflicts between property owners
and regulatory agencies which preceded the
decision. Parts IV and V will then analyze the
decision in light of California's takings history,
the concept of separation of powers, and feder-
al takings law. The Comment will conclude, in
Part VI, that this decision is a regressive step in
the development of California takings law and
has empowered a regulatory body with author-
ity that violates California law, federal law, and
the concept of separation of powers.
III. California Takings Law
The Covalt decision involves California's
ongoing tension between property owners,
courts, and regulatory bodies. California has a
history of providing little protectior to property
owners from governmental regulatory takings.'6
While the state constitution provdes greater
protection to property owners from government
intrusions, the California Supreme Court has
almost eliminated this protection. Recent deci-
sions have moved the cycle back towards rein-
stating some of the protections afforded prop-
erty owners by the California Constitution, but
Covalt represents a step back towards reducing
the ability of property owners to successfully
challenge a government intrusion in court.
along the transmission right-of-ways
12. An increase of 3 miliGaus (MG) is admitted by
SDG&E and the court. See Covalt, 13 Cal, 4th at 911
13. See id.
14. Seeid. at 947
15. See id.
16. See DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY FIGHTS AND THE
CONSTUTION: SHAPING SOciETY THROUGH LAND USE REGULA-
71ON 11 (1993).
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A. California's Starting Point
The starting point for takings in California
is the California Constitution. Article I Section
19 provides that "[plrivate property may be
taken or damaged for public use only when just
compensation, ascertained by a jury has
first been paid to the owner."17 The purpose
of this clause is to distribute throughout the
community the cost born by the individual in
providing for certain elements of the public
welfare.18 Because of the inclusion of the term
"damage," the California Supreme Court has
recognized the intent of the state constitution
to afford greater protection to property owners
from government intrusions on their property
than those provided by the Fifth Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution.i9 At a minimum, the
California government is prohibited from tak-
ing property under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.20 Since
the California Constitution prohibits damaging
property without compensation in addition to
taking property without compensation, the
California government should be subject to
greater scrutiny regarding takings claims.
Recently, however, the California courts have
not taken such a protective view of property
rights.
Under early interpretations of the
California takings clause, the state courts gen-
erally protected the right of an individual to
have his claim heard in court, but made no
guarantees as to having a jury determine
whether a taking had actually occurred. Under
Weber v. Board of Supervisors,21 the California
Supreme Court held that the Constitution con-
templates and provides for a proceeding in
court in all cases where private property is
sought to be taken for public use, and pro-
hibits any other proceeding to that end.22 All
17. CAL. CONSr. art. i. § 19 (emphasis added).
18. 29 Cal. Jur. 3d Eminent Domain § 301-40 (1986).
19. See Varlabedian v. City of Madera. 20 Cal. 3d 285.
298 (1977).
20. The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago. B. & Q
R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
21. 59 Cal. 265, 266 (1881).
22. See id. at 266.
issues, other than compensation, are for the
court.23 Even the state courts' early interpreta-
tions regarding the effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment on California's takings law held
that a judicial proceeding was necessary:
The fixing of the amount payable as
compensation for property taken for
public use presents a judicial question
and it may well be that due process of
law would be lacking in a proceeding by
which the state should assume to take
private property without providing for
the ascertainment of compensation by
some form of judicial proceeding.
lilt is not essential to the due process
as required by the lFlourteenth
[Almendment that the compensation
to be paid for property taken or dam-
aged under the power of eminent
domain be fixed by a fury24
Notwithstanding these early decisions, the
California Supreme Court began to preclude
inverse condemnation suits when they result-
ed from administrative actions. 2' In State v.
Supenor Court (Veta), the California Supreme
Court held that under California Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094 5, when the validity of
an administrative action is at issue, relief must
be sought through an administrative man-
damus proceeding.26 In Agins v City of Tiburon,
the court went a step further in restricting
inverse condemnation claims, holding that
there is no cause of action for inverse condem-
nation when a property owner seeks compen-
sation due to excessive regulation of his prop-
erty.27 The only avenue available for relief
under these circumstances was administrative
23 See People v Ricciard, 23 Cal- 2d 390,402 11943j-
24- Mann Municipal Water Dist- v Mann Water &
Power, 178 Cal 308, 315 (1918)
25, Inverse condemnation, in this case, is where a
property owner seeks compensation for the effect a gov-
ernment regulation has had on the owners property rights,
26, 12 Cal 3d 237, 251 (1974)
27, 24 Cal 3d 266 (1979, alfd on other grounds, 447
US 555 (1980).
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mandamus, where the property owner could
seek to invalidate the regulation. 28 In adopting
this position, the California Supreme Court
reasoned that any regulation that resulted in a
compensable taking but did not provide for
that compensation, was necessarily unconsti-
tutional and therefore invalid.29 If one was to
try to have a regulation declared invalid, the
appropriate avenue was an administrative
mandamus proceeding, not an inverse con-
demnation proceeding. 30
The practical effect of Agins was to elimi-
nate the ability of any property owner to bring
a claim in state court for inverse condemna-
tion. 31 If a regulation was successfully chal-
lenged in a mandamus proceeding, the regula-
tion would be struck down and thus there
would be no taking.32 If the regulation- was
unsuccessfully challenged, then it was a valid,
constitutional regulation and there was no
requirement of compensation. 33
Thus, the California Supreme Court took a
constitutional provision intended to be more
protective of private property rights, and virtu-
ally eliminated many of the protections it was
intended to provide. The California Constitu-
tion explicitly provided not only for protection
against an absolute taking of property, but also
for damage to that property. The intent of this
provision was to increase protection of proper-
ty rights from government intrusions. However,
if the damage to the property was the result of
regulatory action, the court prohibited inverse
condemnation actions. The only remedy avail-
able-to invalidate the regulation-is not the
remedy that is prescribed by the state consti-
tution.
28. See d. at 273.
29. See id. at 272.
30. See id. at 276-77
31. See Sharon Browne, CALIFORNIA PRACTICUM:
Administrative Mandamus as a Prerequisite to Inverse Condemna-
tion: "Healing" California's Confused Takings Law, 22 PEPP. L.
REv, 99, 108 (1994).
32. Since the property owner did not permanently
lose his or her property right, and temporary takings were
not recognized, there could be no claim that a taking had
occurred. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 311-12
B. The United States Supreme Court's
Response
The basic understanding of the Fifth
Amendment is that it does not prohibit the
government from regulating, or taking proper-
ty, but rather "it is a condition on the exercise
of that right."34 The government is riot preclud-
ed from implementing regulations simply
because those regulations "take" property, the
government is simply required to provide just
compensation when this occurs.3 The
California Supreme Court's interpretation of
takings law ran counter to this preriise, and In
First English Evangelical Lutheran Chun'h of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles,36 the United States
Supreme Court overruled Californ a's highest
court.
First English involved the California Court of
Appeal's direct application of the rule adopted
in Agins.37 In this case, the County of Los
Angeles had prohibited the Church from recon-
structing its buildings that had been destroyed
by floods.38 The state court of appeal ruled that
the plaintiff's sole remedy for relief due from a
regulatory takings claim was declaratory relief
or mandamus. 39 Under the Agins decision, no
compensation was required until the regula-
tion was both successfully challenged through
a mandamus proceeding and the government
continued to enforce the regulation 40 In its
response to the California court, the United
States Supreme Court issued a clear state-
ment. Inverse condemnation is a constitution-
ally guaranteed right of action, and the role of
that protection is to ensure compensation, not
invalidate government action.41
"[Wle hold that invalidation of the ordi-
(1987) (discussing Agins, 24 Cal. 3d 266 (1919)).
33. SeeAgins. 24 Cal. 3d at 277
34. First English, 482 U.S. at 314,
35. Seeid. at315.
36. See id. at 304.
37 See id. at 309
38. See id. at 307.
39. See id. at 309.
40. See id. at 308-09.
41. Seeid. at319.
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nance without payment of fair value for the use
of property would be a constitutionally
insufficient remedy."42 The Court clearly stated
that inverse condemnation is not a proceeding
designed to invalidate government intrusions
on property.43 It is an action designed to guar-
antee compensation for the property owner."
C. The California Court's Solution
After First English, it appeared as though
California had just been mandated to start rec-
ognizing regulatory takings/inverse condemna-
tion claims. To the extent that this could be
characterized as one step forward in protecting
private property rights, the decisions that
immediately followed would have to be seen as
two steps back.45 In a continuing effort to
shield the state from the financial conse-
quences of its regulatory action,46 the court of
appeal attempted to merge inverse condemna-
tion claims with administrative mandamus
proceedings.
47
California Coastal Commission v. Superior Court
(Ham) 48 was the court of appeal's first move in
this direction. 49 Ham involved a situation
almost identical to that which the United
States Supreme Court addressed in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.50 A property owner
had been granted a permit to build on his
coastal property provided that he granted the
state a beach access easement over the prop-
erty.5i Since the Federal Supreme Court had
already issued a decision directly on point in
Nollan, Ham should have been resolved lust like
Nollan, and the action should have been found
42. id. at 322.
43. See id. at 315.
44. See id.
45. See Browne, supra note 31, at I 10.
46. See id. at 113.
47. See id. at 112.
48. 210 Cal.App. 3d 1488 (1989).
49. See Browne, supra note 31. at I 10.
50. 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that the California
Coastal Commission's requirement that landowner grant
a public easement providing beach access as a condition
of a permit constituted a compensable taking).
51. See Ham, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1492.
to be a taking The court of appeal, however,
did not see it that way, ruling that the inverse
condemnation action was barred because it
had not been filed along with a petition for a
writ of administrative mandamus 52 Without
citing any authority?53 the court of appeal ruled
that in an "inverse condemnation claim against
the Commission. [a plaintiffI must first
establish the invalidity of the condition the
Commission sought to imposel, andl an
administrative mandamus proceeding pro-
vides the proper vehicle for such a challenge. "54
Rossco Holdings Inc, v Stale55 took the reason-
ing of Ham one step further Rossco held that
administrative mandate was not only the prop-
er forum for evaluating the validity of the regu-
lation, but it was also the appropriate forum to
determine whether a regulatory taking had
occurred 56 Patrick Media Group. Inc v California
Coastal Commission'7 solidified Rosscos holding,
explicitly requiring both the issue of the valid-
ity of the action and the question of whether
that action resulted in a taking be determined
in an administrative mandate proceeding.5
Finally. Tensor Group v. City of Glendale' further
foreclosed judicial review of inverse condem-
nation claims, when the court of appeal held
that after invalidating a regulation in an
administrative hearing, an inverse condemna-
tion claim was barred by res judicata 6 At this
stage, there was, in effect, no room for an
inverse condemnation action to be heard in
the state courts, California's inverse condem-
nation law had virtually returned to its pre-First
English state,
52 Seed at 1501
53 See Browne, supra note 31, at 11
54 Ham. 210 Cal App 3d at 1496
55 212 Cal App 3d642 119891
56 See Browne,. supra note 31, at II 1cting Rossco,
212 Cal App 3d at 658
57 9 Cal App 4th 592 119921
58. See d at 608-09
59 14 Cal App 4th 154 i19931-
60. 'Having chosen not to present [proof of dam-
agesl in the Imandamus proceedingi, the doctnne of res
judicata denies Tensor the opportunity to do so now. See
id, at 160.
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With numerous court of appeal decisions
preventing the lower courts from reviewing
agency actions claimed to be takings, Healing v.
California Coastal Commission6' represented a sub-
stantial departure from the developing prece-
dent. In Healing, the plaintiff was completely
barred from constructing a home on his coastal
property because the Commission could not
determine the environmental impact of the
structure.62 Reviewing a petition to sever the
takings liability issue from the just compensa-
tion issue, the court of appeal chose to take
California's takings law in a new direction,
increasing the protection of private property
rights.6
3
In Healing, the court of appeal explicitly
relected the idea that a legitimate regulation
cannot amount to a taking. 64 The court recog-
nized that even if the regulation was found to be
invalid, Healing could still sue for the tempo-
rary taking of his property.65 In addition, the
court expressly held that takings liability must
be determined at trial with full due process pro-
tections.66 An administrative proceeding was
declared to be totally inadequate to establish
whether a taking had occurred. 67 "As a practical
matter, there is no way a landowner can make
the appropriate record at the administrative
proceedings at which his permit application is
denied."68 Issues such as whether a regulation
results in an applied taking 69 do not, and can-
not, arise until after the hearings are completed
and the regulation is implemented. In addition,
many of the facts critical to an inverse condem-
nation claim are irrelevant to, and thus absent
from, the administrative record.70  The
61. 22 Cal. App. 4th 1158 (1994).
62. See id. at 1165.
63. See Browne, supra note 31, at 120.
64. See Healing, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 1174 ("ITIhe mere
fact that the regulation at issue has a legitimate public
purpose is not a sufficient reason to deny compensation
to the property owner whose land is rendered useless by
the regulation.").
65. See id. at 1169 n.6.
66. See id. at Ii177.
67 See id. at 1i70.
68. Id. at 1175.
69. An as-applied taking occurs when the method
Commission is not a "body authorized to decide
issues of constitutional magnitude "71 Because
of the limited authority of the agency and the
inadequacy of administrative hearings, the
court found that a tnal was necessary, under the
Constitution, in order to determine whether a
taking had occurred 72
After this strong departure from California
precedent, the California Supreme Court
stepped in to resolve the conflict, Hensler v City
of Glendale73 represented this elfort,7 4 and
affirmed the limited scope of an administrative
body's authority: "lAin administrative agency is
not competent to decide whether its, own action
constitutes a taking and, in many cases, admin-
istrative mandate proceedings are not an ade-
quate forum in which to try a takings claim,"75
The court also affirmed the right of a property
owner to have his case fully heard:
If the administrative record is not one in
which the landowner has a full and fair
opportunity to present evidence rele-
vant to the taking issue, one in which
witnesses may be sworn, and testimony
presented by means of direct and cross-
examination, the administrative record
is not an adequate basis on which to
determine if the challenged action con-
stitutes a taking.76
While the court affirmed the limited scope
of authority of the administrative agency, it did
not completely abandon the fundamental
premise underlying the line of cases that
occurred between First English and Healing: regu-
of enforcing a regulation results in a taking An alternate
challenge to a regulation, relating to takings, is a facial
challenge, where the regulation is claimed to be a taking
in every possible application. See Mark A. Chertok, Federal
Regulation of Wetlands, C127 ALI-ABA i131, 1170-1179
(1995).
70. See Healing, 22 Cal. App. 4th at 1175.
71. id. atil78.
72. See id.
73. 8 Cal. 4th I (1994).
74. See Browne, supra note 31, at 124,
75. Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 16.
76. Id.
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lations that resulted in a taking but failed to
provide compensation were invalid.77 The court
still required the property owner to seek to
invalidate the agency action, and to file the ini-
tial complaint within the statute of limitations
applicable to these agency action challenges. 78
The court did not cite any reason for this
requirement, nor state that compensation was
contingent on finding the agency action
invalid.79 The "general theme on this point
seemed to be the circular argument that a regu-
lation that effects a taking cannot be valid
unless it also provides for compensation."8°
After Healing and Hensler, a significant
amount of authority should have been vested in
the courts because they are identified as the
appropriate forum for addressing constitutional
issues.8' According to Hensler, administrative
mandamus is not generally sufficient to address
all of the issues raised in a takings claim, and
administrative agencies do not have the capac-
ity to decide whether their own actions consti-
tute a taking.82 While the property owner is still
required to attempt to invalidate the agency
action, compensation was not contingent on
actually invalidating it.83 These rulings suggest
that, at a minimum, a landowner would be
given the opportunity to litigate a takings claim
based on agency action.8 However, when the
nsk that the government might be found liable
for a taking by a trial court arose in San Diego Gas
& Efectnc v. Superior Court (Covalt).85 the California
Supreme Court backed down from the stance it
had taken on property owners' rights, and
returned the power to rule on the constitution-
ality of an administrative agency's actions to the
agency itself.
77. See Browne, supra note 3 1. at 125.
78. See Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 22.
79. See Browne, supra note 3 1, at 125.
80. Id. (citing Hens er, 8 Cal. 4th at 25).
81. See Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 15.
82. See id. at 16.
83. See Browne. supra note 31. at 127.
84. See id. at 126.
85. 13 Cal. 4th 893 (1996).
86. See id. at 912.
IV. San Diego Gas & Electric v. Superior Court
(Covalt)
San Diego Gas & Electric v. Superior Court
(Covalt) was, in part, an inverse condemnation
claim.8 However, the California Supreme Court
prohibited the claim from being litigated
because it found that administrative action
leading to the takings claim could only be chal-
lenged in.an administrative proceeding 8 7
A. Case Background
In 1988, the California Legislature acknowl-
edged the growing public concern that EMFs
emitted from utility transmission lines were
increasing the cancer risk for property owners
along the utility right-of-ways.M The legislature
directed the State Department of Health
Services (DHSJ and the California Public
Utilities Commission (Commission) to jointly
study the potential effects and report to the
legislature what measures, if any, should be
taken to limit exposure to EMFs,89 In 1989, the
Commission and the DHS issued their
response (Report).90 In the Report, the
Commission recognized that the biological
effects of EMFs had been established, but the
relationship between the biological effects and
public health risks had not yet been deter-
mined.9i As a result of the uncertainty, the
Report recommended that no action be taken
to regulate EMF exposure.°2
In 1990. the Commission followed up this
recommendation with its Kramer-Victor deci-
sion.93 In this decision, the Commission explic-
itly stated that the only thing certain about the
health effects of EMF exposure was that "we do
87 See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
88 Se id at 926
89 Seeid
90 Rep to Leg by Cal PUC & Cal Dept. Health
Services. Potential Health Effects of Electnc and Magnetic
Fields from Electric Power Failities (1989) [hereinafter
Reportl
91 See CovaIt. 13 Cal, 4th at 928 (citing Report. supra
note 90, at B-4)
92 Seeid
93. Re Southern California Edison Company 37
Cal. PU.C 2d 413 (1990) Ihereinafter Kramer-Victori.
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not know enough to dismiss the issue entire-
ly."94 The chosen response to this uncertainty
was to maintain the status quo.95 Four months
after this decision, the Commission reopened
its investigation into the issue and appointed
an advisory panel (Consensus Group) to review
the developing scientific information and the
concerns of various industry stake holders.96
The Consensus Group reported that the scien-
tific community still had not concluded
whether there is a health risk, and recom-
mended essentially two courses of action: (1)
continue research and education on the issue;
and (2) permit utilities to implement low and
no cost measures to reduce EMF exposure lev-
els on new projects. 97 The Commission pro-
mulgated regulations in line with these recom-
mendations. 9
8
Between February and July of 1990, San
Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) upgraded the
distribution lines running behind the home of
Martin and Joyce Covalt. 99 Prior to the upgrade,
the easement had housed two 12 kilovolt (kV)
distribution circuitsOO After the upgrade, a
third 12 kV circuit was added.i 01 To accommo-
date this third circuit, double poles replaced
the original single poles supporting the distri-
bution lines. 02 As a result, the lines were
moved 2.5 to 3.5 feet closer to the Covalt's
home and increased EMF exposure levels by
approximately 3.9 miliGaus. 103 Shortly after
this occurred, the Covalt's vacated the house
and filed suit.i04
At the trial court level, SDG&E's demur to
the complaint was overruled; the trial judge
94. Id. at 453.
95 See id.
96. See Covalt, 13 cal. 4th at 929
97 See id. at 929-35.
98. See id. at 934 (citing Re Rules, Procedures and
Practices Applicable to Transmission Lines Not
Exceeding 200 Kilovolts, 55 Cal. P.U.C.2d 87 (1994)).




103. MiliGaus are the unit of measure used for
EMF levels. See id.
104. See id.
found the claim was sufficient tD warrant a
trial.' 05 SDG&E appealed the ruling, and the
court of appeal granted review cn the basis
that extraordinary relief was warranted) 0 6 On
appeal, after confirming that extraordinary
relief was warranted, the court of appeal
reached and ruled on the merits of the case
without the benefit of a record from an eviden-
tiary trial. 07 The court of appeal ruled that the
Commission has exclusive lurisdictlon over all
issues raised by the plaintiffs and issued a writ
of mandate directing the trial court to vacate
its order overruling the demur and to issue a
new order sustaining the demur 108 The
Supreme Court of California granted review to
determine whether a trial court is barred from
hearing an action claiming property damage
resulting from EMF exposure.109
B. The Decision
Before reaching the issues it granted
review on, the Supreme Court of California
began its opinion with an eight page disserta-
tion on the innocuousness of EMFs.110 After
providing this background information, the
court began to discuss the following central
issues: (1) whether the Commission has the
authority to adopt a policy on the health risks
posed by EMFs;Iii (2) whether a policy was in
fact adopted; 112 and (3) whether a court ruling
on the issue would conflict with the
Commission's policy on EMFs.1i 3 Underlying
all of these issues was the question of whether
the Commission has exclusive luri3diction. 114
The initial issue the court addressed was
105. See id. at 912.
106. See id. at 913.
107 See id.
108. See id. at 914.
109 See id. at 902.
110. See id.at 903-1I. The relevance of the degree
of harm EMFs pose to the public was not an Issue In
the case presented, nor was it clear what impact the
risk EMFs pose had on the Jurisdiction of the
Commission.
11. Seeid. at923.
112. See id. at 926.
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the conflict between two statutes. California
Public Utilities Code section 1759 provides
that "[njo court of this State, except the
Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction to
review, reverse, correct or annul any order or
decision of the commission . or to enloin,
restrain or interfere with the performance of
its official duties."ii 5 Section 2106, however,
conflicts with this statute, providing that the
courts are permitted to take jurisdiction and
to assign actual and exemplary damages if a
public utility "does, causes to be done, or per-
mits any act prohibited or declared unlawful
either by the Constitution, any law of this
state, or any order or decision of the
Commission."'i 6 The resolution of this issue is
central to the scope of authority granted to
the Commission. Because both statutes are in
direct conflict, the resolution of the issue nec-
essarily either empowers the Commission by
preventing courts from reviewing the
Commission's actions, or it empowers the
courts by granting the court this power.
In resolving the dispute, the court relied on
its Waters v. Pacific Telephone Co.1 17 decision where
it held that section 2106 is construed as limited
to those situations in which an award of dam-
ages would not hinder or frustrate the
Commission's declared supervisory and regula-
tory policies." 18 Under this rule, actions brought
against a public utility under section 2106 are
barred unless an award of damages would not
undermine the "general supervisory or regula-
tory policy of the Commission."i 9 Citing the
constitutional authority of the legislature to
establish the scope of judicial review of com-
mission actions 120 and the liberal interpreta-
115. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 1759 (West 1997).
116. Cal. Pub. Util. Code § 2106 (West 1997) (em-
phasis added).
117. 12Cal. 3d 1 (1974).
118. See Covalt, 13 Cal. 4th at 918.
119. Id.




tion of the Commission's authority as cover-
ing legislative and ludicial powers, in addition
to its administrative authorityi 21 the court
affirmed the Waters test for exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Commission,122 With this issue
resolved, the court moved on to address
whether, in this case, the Waters rule would be
violated by a trial 123
In deciding whether the Waters rule was
violated, the first question the court asked
was whether the Commission has the authori-
ty to adopt a policy on the potential health
risks of EMFs 124 The source the court looked
to in making this determination was the scope
of authority the legislature had conferred upon
the Commission.125 Under the Public Utilities
Act, the Commission is required to ensure
that utilities maintain and operate a safe and
reliable method of providing service.126 This
authority was reinforced by Public Utilities
Code sections 8026 to 8036, which require the
Commission to ensure public utilities make
any changes necessary -for the purpose of
safety to employees and the general pub-
lic." 127 This duty, along with the authority to
regulate all new construction by public utili-
ties, led the court to conclude that the
Commission has the authority to regulate and
declare policy on the public health effects of
EMF exposure, 128
The next question was whether the
Commission had in fact declared such a poli-
cyi 29 There were three sources of information
on this question The first was a series of
reports prepared by the Commission at the
request of the Legislature;130 the second was
the Kramer-Victorl31 decision issued by the
124 See id
125. Sted
126. See id at 924
127 Id at 924-25.
128- See id at 923
129. Seeid at 926
130 See id. at 926
131, Re Southern California Edison, 37 Cal. P.U.C.
2d 413 (1990).
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Commission; 132 and the third was the Com-
mission's regulations.
33
The Commission had prepared two reports.
The first was a report prepared at the specific
direction of the Legislature, and was per-
formed in conjunction with the DHS.134 The
Commission and DHS report concluded that
while the biological effects of EMF exposure
were "clearly established," the public health
risks of those effects had not yet been estab-
lished.135 The second report, prepared by an
advisory panel, came to a similar conclusion
and recommended that the Commission adopt
a policy authorizing utilities to voluntarily
adopt no and low cost measures to reduce
EMF exposure 36 This proposal was precisely
in line with the Commission's Kramer-Victor
decision, which stated that the "jury is out on
the question of transmission line-related
health risks." 137 This decision declared that
utilities were required to take "reasonable
steps" to limit the increase in EMF exposure to
workers and people living along transmission
right-of-ways.i 38 This decision and the reports
led to the passing of Rules, Procedures and
Practices Applicable to Transmission Lines Not Ex-
ceeding 200 Kilovolts which set forth the Com-
mission's policy on EMF exposure 39
Having identified a policy bearing on EMF
exposure and the authority to adopt the policy,
the court then turned to whether permitting
the trial court to try the issue of the ramifica-
tions of EMF exposure would interfere with
that policy.140 Initially there were four causes of
132. See Covalt, 13 Cal. 4th at 928.
133. See id. at 934.
134. See id. at 926.
135. See id. at 928 (citing Report, supra note 91. at C-22,
B-4).
136. See id. at 929-30.
137. Id. at 928 (citing Kramer-Victor, 37 Cal. RU.C. 2d at
453).
138. See id. at 929 (citing Kramer-Victor, 37 Cal. PU.C. 2d
at 463).
139. "'Accordingly Ithe Commission] requirelsi that
until such time as the Commission issues new guidelines, the
utilities shall implement low-cost EMF mitigation measures
In new and upgraded projects unless exempted by the utility's
design guideline exemption critena. Rules, Procedures and
Practices Applicable to Transmission Lines Not Exceeding 200
action raised by Martin and Joyce Covalt. (I) a
personal injury claim, (2) a trespass claim, (3)
a nuisance claim and (4) an inverse condemna-
tion claim. The plaintiffs dropped the personal
injury claim. 141 The trespass claim was dis-
missed largely because of the intangible
nature of EMFs. 142 The nuisance cause of
action was dismissed on the grounds that the
plaintiffs failed to adequately plead nuisance,
and even if they amended their complaint to
satisfy the pleading requirement, the finder of
fact would still be required to find that any
harm outweighed the social utilitiy of the con-
duct. 143 In this case, the Commission had
already performed the balancing test, and a
jury finding would necessarily conflict with this
policy. 44 The inverse condemnation cause of
action thus remained.
The inverse condemnation action was
addressed in two steps. First, the court held
that EMF exposure did not constitute a tangi-
ble intrusion,' 45 nor did it inflict any physical
damage to the property. 46 As such, in order for
EMF exposure to amount to a compensable
taking, it must result in a direct, substantial
and peculiar burden on the property) 47 The
court simply stated that the plaintiffs were
unable to allege that the EMFs caused a "direct
and substantial burden." 148 To the extent that
the court recognized that the plaintiffs might
be able to plead a direct and substantial bur-
den 149 the court declined to provide them with
the opportunity to prove their case with evi-
dence by sustaining SDG&E's demur."50
Kilovolts, 55 Cal. RU.C. 2d at 100:* Id. at 934.
140. See id. at 935.
141. Seeid. at 935.
142. See id. at 935-37.
143. See id. at 939.
144. See id. at 939.
145. See id. at 940.
146. See id. at 940.
147. See id. at 940-41 (citing the Variabelian rule)
148. Id. at 942.
149. See id. at 943 (stating that the plaintiffs did plead
the EMF exposure caused a direct and substantial burden
because of the resulting fear).
150. Seeid.at 951.
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Without any evidentiary hearing, the Supreme
Court of California declared that an inverse
condemnation claim based on EMF exposure
cannot be pleaded simply because to permit this
would interfere with the Commission's regula-
tory authority.
15
Two concepts are at the root of this deci-
sion. First, there is no judicial review of an issue
that would result in the trial court interfering
with the regulatory authority of the
Commission. Second, property cannot be dam-
aged or invaded by something that the Conmis-
sion has found to be harmless. These concepts
run counter to California's takings law, federal
takings policy, and the philosophy of separa-
tion of powers.
V. Conflicts Between California and
Federal Concepts of judicial Review of
Takings
Covalt does not discuss the authority of the
court to review takings claims, the inability of
the Commission to award damages for a taking.
or the issue of separation of powers. In its fail-
ure to address these issues, the court has put
forth a decision running counter to the new
protections it was developing under California's
takings doctrine. It has also rejected the con-
cept of separation of powers-a fundamental
principle of this country's government-and
has virtually eliminated the ability of property
owners to be compensated for harm resulting
from government, sanctioned intrusions which
the government considers harmless.
A. Contradictions with California Takings Law
Healing and Hensler represented a move
towards increasing property owners' protec-
tions and increasing the scope of judicial
151. The Court dedared the parties cannot allege a
taking based on their discussion of inverse condemna-
tion. See id. at 950. In the Court's discussion of inverse
condemnation it stated that the parties cannot allege any
substantial burden on property caused by EMFs. see Id. at
942, but, apparently contradicting itself, the Court also
stated that the plaintiff's did allege the substantial bur-
den, see id. at 943. The only real reason for not permit-
ting the plaintiffs to plead inverse condemnation is that
to do so would necessarily conflict with the Commission's
review of agency actions,152 The court recog-
nized that administrative agencies are not the
appropriate body to evaluate whether their own
actions constitute a taking and recognized that
an agency could be acting within its scope of
authority and still effect a taking-i53 if the court
followed this holding in Covalt, then permitting
a court to rule that a Commission action result-
ed in a taking would not interfere with the
Commission's performance of its regulatory
duties. The court, however, did not follow the
Healing and Hensler precedent. The Covalt deci-
sion conflicts with both Healing and Hensler in
two ways.
The first conflict arises from the holding in
Hensler that administrative agencies are not
competent to rule on the constitutionality of
their own actions.14 On its face, this holding
suggests that there are no circumstances under
which an administrative body could be empow-
ered to rule on this issue. Beyond that, in most
instances administrative agencies do not have
the authority to provide compensation when a
taking occurs.155
In Covalt, the court ruled that the
Commission has the authority to adopt a poli-
cy on the health effects of EMFs." 6 Under sec-
tions 1759 and 2106 of the California Public
Utilities Code, the courts cannot interfere with
the role of enforcing this policy.157 In effect, this
has allowed the Commission to decide what
constitutes an environmental harm in the con-
text of activities undertaken by regulated utili-
ties. When the Commission decides that some-
thing is not an environmental harm, the courts
cannot rule that exposure to it resulted in harm
to person or property without conflicting with
the Commission's authority. As such, under the
court's interpretation of sections 1759 and
2106, the trial court does not have the authon-
findings that EMFs have not yet been found to be harm-
ful. See id. at 939
152. See supra section III.C
153, See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
154 See Henskr, 8 Cal 4th at 15-16
155 See Covlt. 13 Cal. 4th at 950-
156 Seeid at 923
157 See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
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ty to review the Commission's determina-
tion. 158 By default, this leaves the Commission
with the authority to decide whether its action
of defining what constitutes harm results in
any takings of property. This is a constitution-
al issue, which, under Healing and Hensler,
should be reserved for the courts.
The second conflict between Covalt and the
Healing and Hensler case arises from the consti-
tutional inadequacies of the court mandated
forum for hearing the dispute. In Hensler, the
California Supreme Court identified explicit
requirements in order for an administrative
hearing to provide an adequate forum to test
the constitutionality of an agency action:
If the administrative hearing is not one
in which the landowner has a full and
fair opportunity to present evidence
relevant to the taking issue, one in
which witnesses may be sworn, and
testimony presented by means of
direct and cross-examination, the
administrative record is not an ade-
quate basis on which to determine if
the challenged action constitutes a
taking.159
The proceeding must allow for "full litiga-
tion of the facts relevant to the takings issue,"
and apply a de novo review of the evidence in
order to amount to a judicial determination. 160
This is very different than the method of review
required in a typical administrative man-
damus proceeding, which is limited to an
abuse of discretion standard of review usually
based on the administrative record.' 6' In order
to ensure the plaintiff conformed with the
requirement to challenge the regulation in the
administrative mandamus proceeding, but
still permit the plaintiff to litigate the inverse
condemnation claim, a remedy mandated in
First English, the court permitted the plaintiff to
158. See supra section IV.B. i.
159. Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 16.
160. See id.
161. See Browne, supra note 31, at 104-05.
162. See Hensler, 8 Cal. 4th at 14.
join the claims. 6 2 This holding permits the
property owner to litigate the inverse condem-
nation claim, while still permitting the govern-
ment to have the opportunity to have the reg-
ulation invalidated, potentially reducing the
government's liability for the taking. 163 What
the Hensler holding does not do is preclude the
property owner from litigating the inverse con-
demnation claim. 164
However, in Covalt, the California Supreme
Court did preclude the property owner from
litigating the inverse condemnation claim.
While the court acknowledged that the plain-
tiffs had alleged that the intrusion resulted in
a substantial burden, it refused to permit the
issue to be litigated.' 6' By holding the
Commission had exclusive jurisdiction over
the issue of EMFs causing harm, the court left
no room for the plaintiffs to litigate the
inverse condemiation claim. The court point-
ed out several times that the first step in alleg-
ing a taking is to allege damage to property. 166
At the same time, the court relied on the
Commission's decision that EMFs do not
cause harm to prevent the plaintiffs from even
pleading that a harm or taking has occurred. 167
The court thus empowered the Commission to
preclude takings claims founded on actions
taken by the Commission, counter to the
court's decision in Hensler
The holding in Covalt is a giart leap back-
ward, usurping the progress made in protect-
ing property owners rights in Healing and
Hensler The Commission is free to define envi-
ronmental harm as it relates to public health.
That definition is binding on the courts and
not subject to judicial review. Independent of
whether there is in fact a taking, allowing the
Commission's findings to preclude a court
from evaluating whether a constitutional tak-




165. See supra note 152 and accompanying text,
166. See Covalt, 13 Cal. 4th 893, 942 (1996).
167. See id.
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B. Contradictions With Separation of
Powers
In addition to contradicting the state's
own takings law, the California Supreme Court
has issued an opinion that contradicts the sep-
aration of powers philosophy underlying all
governments in this country. In order for the
constitutionally created separation of powers
to function properly, the judiciary must have
the authority to review the actions of the legis-
lature and executive.168 By permitting the legis-
lature to eliminate the role of the judiciary in
reviewing the constitutional issue of a taking,
the court has vested the same branch of gov-
ernment, the Commission. with the power to
decide whether its own actions are constitu-
tional. This violates separation of powers.
In forming the new American government.
the colonists did not attempt to establish an
entirely new philosophy of government. 169
European philosophers, in particular John
Locke and Charles Montesquieu heavily influ-
enced the colonists.lO Underlyingjohn Locke's
philosophy is the idea that all individuals have
certain inalienable rights.i 7i In an effort to
secure a stable and safe society, each individ-
ual surrenders some of these rights to the
greater society. 72 This greater society-the
government-is expected to act only in the
interests of the individuals within the society,
and it is the role of the individuals to guard
against abuses by the government.'
73
Montesquieu also acknowledged the impor-
tance of protecting individual rights, and felt
that it was the role of the government to per-
form this task. 74 Under his vision of govern-
ment, the protection against abuses was estab-
lished through separation of powers:i
7 5
168. See Randolph May, Independent Judicial Review. An
appreciation of its origins and some contemporary musing about its
role two hundred years later. 2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv 195.
196 n.3 (1993).
169. See id. at 196-97.




There is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the leg-
islative and executive. Were it joined
with the legislative, the life and liberty
of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control; for the judge would
be then the legislator. Were it joined to
the executive power, the judge might
behave with violence and oppres-
sion)176
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton
were at the center of the debates on the scope
of the power of the judiciary. 77 Hamilton advo-
cated a more limited role for the judiciary,
expressly stating his reliance on
Montesquieu's philosophies in Federalist 78.178
The judiciary was to be the weakest branch of
government.19 This position eventually gave
way to Madison's view, where the judiciary
would be established to protect individual
rights against unconstitutional legislative or
executive action 180 This was a necessary result,
given the purpose of a limited Constitution. 81
The complete independence of the
courts of justice is peculiarly essential
in a limited constitution. Without
this, all the reservation of particular
rights or privileges would amount to
nothing-
The interpretation of the laws is the
proper and peculiar province of the
courts. A constitution is, in part, and
must be regarded by judges as, a fun-
damental law. It therefore belongs to
them to ascertain its meaning as well
as the meaning of any particular act
174 Id at 198
175 See id
176 Id, (quoting CHAIZLEs D. MoN'TEsuEu. TsE SmPrr
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proceeding from the legislative body. If
there should happen to be an irrecon-
cilable variance between the two, that
which has the superior obligation and
validity ought, of course, to be pre-
ferred; or, in other words, the
Constitution ought to be preferred to
the statute. 18
2
Under this view of judicial power, the
Constitution could provide the basis to strike
down the actions of the elected branches of
government. 8 3 The purpose of this level of
review was to ensure that the "tyranny of the
legislatures," the "most formidable dread at
present," was protected against.1'4
While these philosophies influenced the
drafting of the Constitution, the role of judi-
cial review was not definitively solidified until
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Constitution in Marbury v. Madison.1 5 Marbury
serves as the precedential source of the
Supreme Court's ultimate power of ludicial
review.
In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall ruled
on the ultimate power of the Supreme Court
to review the decisions of both the legislature
and the executive.'8 6 Chief Justice Marshall
ruled that the Constitution was something
more than an ordinary law; it was a paramount
law, and as such any acts by the government
that conflict with it are necessarily void. 187 All
branches of government are bound by the
Constitution, and may not exercise power
beyond that which the Constitution has
granted.188
This decision is based on having a gov-
ernment of limited authority and a separa-
tion of what authority it has. 8 9 Marshall
explicitly stated that the federal government








is one of limited power 90 It has only the
power granted to it by the people, similar to
Locke's viewpoint. 191 As such, there must be
some body to determine when the govern-
ment has acted beyond the scope of Its
power. 192 Through his interpretation of the
Constitution, Marshall declared the judiciary
to be that body.193
In Covalt, the California Supreme Court
eliminated this critical role of the judiciary.
The decision on whether the exposure
amounted to compensable harm is now com-
pletely internalized. The court allowed the
Commission to define environmental harm.
Since the Commission, in the court's opinion,
had already decided that EMFs are not harm-
ful, there can be no claim tha-: harm has
resulted from EMF exposure that" would not
conflict with the Commission's policy.194 The
courts are not permitted to interfere with
Commission policy. Since the court may not
interfere with the policy of the Commission,
the plaintiffs cannot allege that harm has
occurred in an inverse condemnation claim.
By internalizing the process of reviewing gov-
ernment action, the Court has violated the
concept of separation of powers.
One counter-argument is that the admin-
istrative proceedings permitted by the Court
already provide sufficient protections to
property owners. The problem with this argu-
ment is that it requires ignoring decisions by
both the California and United States
Supreme Courts. These courts have already
held that the administrative remedies nor-
mally permitted in reviewing an agency deci-
sion do not provide the same constitutional-
ly guaranteed protections that lucicial review
provides 95 The United States Supreme Court






194. See supra section IV.B,1.
195. See supra section V.
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with the use of administrative mandamus
proceedings in deciding regulator takings
claims. 96 In Dolan v. City of Tigard,197 the
Supreme Court explicitly required that the gov-
ernment prove the legitimacy of the regulation
when the regulation is challenged as a tak-
ing. 98 However, in a mandamus proceeding,
the plaintiff bears this burden. California has
never complied with the Court's heightened
requirement, and to the extent the standard is
required, the administrative record is insuffi-
cient to permit it.19
Beyond the substantive deficiencies of the
mandamus proceeding, there are some legiti-
mate historically demonstrable problems with
relying on a government agency to effectively
define harm. In Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
Coons,2 ° the government claimed that lowering
the water level along a riparian landowner's
property did not constitute a taking.20i In
Livermore v. Town of Jamaica.202 the government
refused to pay compensation for a revertible
easement obtained for a highway project.20 3 In
Beseman v. Pennsylvania Railroad,2°4 the govern-
ment refused to compensate a property owner
for rendering his property uninhabitable by
permitting freight cars loaded with "offensive
freight" to remain within ten feet of the
house.205 In Alexander v. City of Milwaukee,206 the
city was not required to pay compensation for
washing away part of the landowner's proper-
ty.207 While in each of these cases the govern-
ment's position was supported by the court,
these cases, along with virtually all inverse
condemnation cases brought in more modern
times, suggest the government will not volun-
tarily pay for takings absent a clear directive
196. Covalt could amount to a regulatory tpking
claim in that the taking occurred because of the method
by which the Commission chose to regulate EMFs.
197. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
198. See id.
199. See Browne, supra note 3 1. at i 16-17.
200. 6Watts&S 101 (pa. 1843).
201. See-WILuAM B. STOEBUCK. NONTRESPASSORY TAx-
INGS IN EMINENT DoMAIN 2 (1977).
202. 23 Vt. 361 (1851).
203. See Joseph M. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of
Eminent Domain. 41 YALE L.J. 221. 229 (193 I).
from the court to do so.
Between the substantive deficiencies of
administrative mandamus, the historical prob-
lems with relying on the government's determi-
nation of when a taking has occurred, and the
general philosophy that the branch of govern-
ment taking an action should not rule on that
action's constitutional ramifications, the
California Supreme Court has inappropriately
vested too much power within the Commis-
sion.
C. Contradictions With Takings Law: The
Court's Failure to Fulfill its Protective
Role
The concept of requiring compensation
when private property is taken for public use
has roots stemming back to the beginning of
law.208 It is found in Roman Law, the Code of
Napoleon and the early legal systems of the
American colonsts, 20 9 It is -one of the most
universally recognized principles of justice."210
Under the United States Constitution, the Fifth
Amendment protection against taking property
without just compensation can be seen as one
form of protection against maloritarian abuses,
one of the primary purposes driving the forma-
tion of the Constitution.211 In this case, there is
no dispute that actions were taken for public
purposes, 212 the only dispute is whether prop-
erty was actually taken. The court, however,
refused to permit the plaintiffs to even plead
that damage to property had occurred 213 This
refusal to permit the claim to be heard in court
conflicts with the purpose and the historic
development of takings law.
From Federalist Number 10. government
204 13A 164 (1888).
205, See Cormack, supra note 203, at 230
206 16Wis 264 (1862)
207 See Cormack, supra note 203, at 230
208 See STOEBUCK, supra note 201, at 4
209 See Cormack, supra note 203, at 221-22
210 id
21 I See Neil K Komensar A lob for the judges, The
judiciary and the Constitution in a Massive and Complex Society,
86 MICH L REv 657.675-83 (1988)-
212. SeeCoalt 13Cal,4th893.941(1996).
213 Seetd
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factionalism in-the form of takings occurs when
the individual loses -property to benefit the
majority.214 An individual is the ultimate
minority, with little or no ability to protect his
own rights in the legislative process. Madison
sought to protect against both the vocal major-
ity, and the organized minority, either of which
could influence the government in a manner
that would adversely affect individual rights.215
The separation of powers, including judicial
review, was one of the means used to provide
those protections.
216
In the situation where an individual's prop-
erty is taken for a public purpose, to the bene-
fit of either an organized minority or an influ-
ential majority, it is the role of the courts to
protect the affected minority's rights; courts
prevent the individual from bearing costs that
society should bear as a whole. 217 By deferring
to the Commission's decision on EMFs, the
court is failing to provide a forum in which the
property owner may obtain this protection. The
court does not provide protection from faction-
alism when it rules that the arm of the govern-
ment accused of engaging in factionalism is
empowered to decide whether the individual
has been harmed. By refusing to permit the
lower courts to review the actions taken by the
Commission, the California Supreme Court has
lost sight of the role the courts play in prevent-
ing the government from usurping the rights of
the individuals.
D. Contradictions With Takings Law: The
Court's Regressive Definition of Property
Implicit in the right to compensation when
there is a taking is the question of what consti-
tutes a taking. At this stage, it is helpful to look
at two different concepts of property- mental
214. See Randall T. Perdue, The Countermajoritanan
"Ideal" The Role of Judkial Review Under Regulatory Takings
Analysis, 2 GEo. MASON L. REV. 333, 340 (1995).
215. See Komensar, supra note 2 1I, at 675-83.
216. See May, supra note 168, at 204.
217 See supra section III.
218. See corrnack, supra note 203, at 222-24.
219. See id.
220. See R. S. Radford, Why Rent Control is a Regulatory
Taking, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 755, 756 (1995).
and physical property.218 The selection of which
concept applies has significant conse-
quences, 219 and the Constitution itself, along
with its history, provides no real guidance as to
which was intended.
220
Under the purely physical concept of prop-
erty, in order for a taking to occur, the person
must be physically deprived of the, property.
22'
Initially this concept of property was suffi-
cient.222 However, as the country evolved, this
concept of property began to lead to some
unacceptable results. 223 Because the purely
physical definition of property failed to accom-
plish the purpose of the Fifth Amendment, the
United States Supreme Court eventually aban-
doned it.224
Crenshaw v. Slate River Co. (1828)225 was one
of the earliest moves away from the purely
physical concept of property.226 Here, the Court
recognized that destroying the value of proper-
ty is equivalent to destroying the property-
"Here then, is a Law imposing upon the citizen
a burthen, which would render his property
worthless. I must declare the law
unconstitutional and void."
227
Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co.
228
represented the Court's move towards recog-
nizing that damage to property can be extreme
enough to require compensation, even though
the government has not taken title to the prop-
erty.
2 29
it would be a very curious and unsatis-
factory result, if in construing a provi-
sion of constitutional law, always
understood to have been adooted for
protection and security to the rights of
the individual as against the govern-
ment, it shall be held that if the




225.. 6 Rand, 245 (Va. 1828).
226. See Cormack, supra note 203. at 232.
227. Id. (quoting Crenshaw, 6 Rand. at 264).
228. 80 U.S. 166(1871),
229. See Cormack, supra note 203, at 233.
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government refrains from absolute
conversion of real property to the uses
of the public it can destroy its value
entirely, without making any com-
pensation. because, in the narrowest
sense of that word, it is not taken for
the public use. Such a construction
would pervert the constitutional provi-
sion into a restriction upon the rights
of the citizen instead of the govern-
ment, and make [the constitutional
provision] an authority for invasion of
private right under the pretext of the
public good, which had no warrant in
the laws or practices of our ances-
tors. 230
While this case represents a move away from
the purely physical definition of property, it
was still limited to purely physical invasions of
property, and so preserves many of the con-
cepts associated with the physical definition of
property.
231
The ultimate recognition that property
exists beyond its physical manifestation can be
seen in Justice Holmes' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon 232 decision. This case was the first recog-
nition by the Court that the use of property
could be regulated to such an extent that the
regulation would be recognized as a taking.
2 33
Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to proper-
ty could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the
general law. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits,
or the contract and due process claus-
es are gone. One fact for consideration
in determining such limits is the extent
230. Pumpelly. 80 U.S. at 177-78 (emphasis added).
231. See Cormack. supra note 203. at 233.
232. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
233. See STOEBUCK. supra note 20 1, at 269.
234. Pennsylvania Coal. 260 U.S. at 413.
235. id. at 415.
236. Id.
237. See id.
of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all
cases there must be an exercise of emi-
nent domain and compensation to
sustain the act. 2u
"The general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking." 235
The limits of this statement continue to be
explored by the courts, but the recognition
remains important. property can be taken
through means other than simply acquiring
title and can be destroyed through means
other than damaging its physical manifesta-
tion,
While Holmes found that in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v Mahon the regulation at issue did
constitute a taking, he recognized that this will
not always be the case,236 Holmes identified
the two extremes of government regulation:
the legitimate right of the government to regu-
late land use and the extreme regulation that
results in unconstitutionally depriving the
property owners of the right to use their prop-
erty 2 37 The issue in cases where the govern-
ment is either permitting or prohibiting activi-
ty property, is whether the government is oper-
ating within its legitimate police power, or
whether the government has overstepped that
legitimate power and effected a taking_238
The legitimate police power of the state is
extremely broad, sublect to only two real limi-
tations, First, the power must be exercised for
the public welfare, and second, it must not
amount to a taking of property.239 The Court's
ability to determine whether either of these
limitations has been violated is very limited.24
238 Either permitting or prohibiting an activity on
a pnvate property can amount to a taking In either case,
when the government does not offer to pay for the taking,
an inverse condemnation action is used to recover for the
taking
239 See STCE6UCK, supra note 201, at 168-69
240 See d
241, 348 US 26 (1954)
242 id
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In Berman v. Parker,241 the Court explicitly limit-
ed its own ability to evaluate what constitutes
a public purpose. "[Wlhen the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared
in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases
the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main
guardian of the public needs to be served by
social legislation."242 In Consolidated Rock
Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 243 the court
refused to limit the government's ability to
regulate zoning.2 44 The California Supreme
Court refused to apply the Pennsylvania Coal
test to zoning disputes, instead adopting the
reasonable basis test.
"If the validity of the legislative classi-
fication for zoning purposes be fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control." This test
of the validity of comprehensive zon-
ing regulations has consistently been
applied and followed by this court, so
that whenever we have found that rea-
sonable minds might differ as to the
necessity or propriety of particular
regulations or classifications, we have
bowed to the legislative determina-
tion and sustained the regulation.
245
The United States Supreme Court declined to
overrule this decision.2 46
In spite of both of these severe limita-
tions, the Court has retained the power to
limit the state's ability to regulate out of the
belief that the "states cannot be entrusted to
protect the constitutional rights of individu-
243. 57 Cal. 2d 515 (1962), appeal dismissed 371 U.S.
36 (1962).
244. The Court adopted the reasonable basis test
for challenges to zoning regulations. See id. at 522.
245. Id. Consolidated Rock at 522-23 (quoting
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2772 U.S. 365, 388
(1926)).
246. See generally Geer v. Bowers, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
247 See Tern Pandolfi, Comment: Putting The Cart
Before The Horse: Just Compensation For Regulatory Takings in
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1413, 1446 (1989).
248. See Howard J. Graham, Our "Declaratory" Four-
als." 247 It was this very problem that led to the
passage of the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Court requiring the states to protect those
rights.248
The choice between what constitutes a
legitimate police action and a compensable
taking is a decision that the courts are called
upon to make. 249 It is the essence of separa-
tion of powers and clearly necessitates judi-
cial review. In the Covalt case, by relying on the
purely physical definition of property, the
court was able to evade resolving the conflict
between a legitimate police action and an
overreaching regulation that results in a tak-
ing. If the Commission had declared that a
physical invasion that could be perceived by
one of the five normal senses did not amount
to harm, the court would have had no choice
but to hear the case and decide whetfher the
regulation was a legitimate exercise of police
power. Failure to do this would 1'ave placed
California takings law in direct conflict with
clear precedent.250
The Commission has exclusive jurisdic-
tion over the issue only because the court
ignored nonphysical forms of tEkings, The
problem with the court's position is that the
United States Supreme Court has long since
rejected the notiorn that takings cannot result
from damage to something other than the
purely physical manifestation of property.25' If
diminution of value may constitute a taking
under the Federal Constitution, it should also
be possible for such a diminution of value to
constitute a taking under California's more
protective Constitution. At a minimum, the
teenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REv. 3.23-26 (1954),
249. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. it Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922).
250. When the invasion of the property has been
the result of something physical, the United States
Supreme Court has almost universally held the Invasion
constitutes a taking. See. e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S, 419 (1982) (affirming the
traditional rule that a permanent physical Invasion of
property is a taking).
251. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393;
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Miss, Canal Co., 80 U.S, 166, 166
(1871).
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Court should have been required to decide
whether EMF exposure could amount to a tak-
ing as a matter of law, rather than simply
declare the Commission has exclusive luris-
diction over the issue.
VI. Conclusion
The Constitution has been interpreted as
having created a government of limited power.
A judiciary was established to ensure that the
government operated within the boundaries of
those limitations. One of the limitations was
that the government may not take property
without compensation. In California, the state
supreme court relected both of these concepts.
The court vested the Commission with the
power to define what constitutes an environ-
mental harm, i.e., a public health risk, as it
relates to public utilities. The court refused to
permit property owners to demonstrate,
through litigation, that increased EMF expo-
sure results in damage to property, and that
this damage is suffered independent of the
Commission's view on EMFs. Without a trial,
without the sworn testimony of witnesses or
the opportunity to cross examine the govern-
ment witness, the California Supreme Court
summarily dismissed any claim that a taking
may have occurred because to find that a tak-
ing occurred would conflict with the authority
of the Commission.
By taking this view, the court refused to
review whether the Commission's regulation
was a taking. The only avenue of attack now
remaining, had the statute of limitations not
expired, would be to appeal to the Commis-
sion itself or the courts through administrative
mandamus to have the regulation declared
invalid. This represents a return by the
California Supreme Court to its pre-First English
rule. eliminating inverse condemnation as a
cause of action once the Commission makes a
valid determination that no harm is caused by
the intrusion, By finding the issue within the
exclusive lurisdiction of the Commission, the
California Supreme Court eliminated some of
the protections that the separation of powers
normally provides and left a property owner
with no opportunity to obtain the protections
guaranteed under the federal and state consti-
tutions.
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